The Fall of “Elephant” :

The Plight of “Elephant” : Laotian Army Battalion BV-33 and the first Use of Armor in the Indochina War

@ 2002 by Peter Brush

The Ho Chi Minh Trail was built to ensure the flow of men and supplies from north to south. It always ran through the heart of the war in Vietnam. From the very beginning of the fighting, American and South Vietnamese military forces made extraordinary efforts to interdict The Trail. In the same manner the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) spared nothing in order to keep it open. This is the story of one such effort. For the Americans it was the first use of armor by the enemy in the war in Indochina. For the NVA it was part of their attack against Khe Sanh and an opening move of the 1968 Tet Offensive.

Vietnam stretches one thousand miles from top to bottom. During the First Indochina War (1946-1954), Communist forces (Viet Minh) devised ways to move supplies from the top, coming in from China, to Vietnam’s southernmost battlefields. Compounding this task was the fact that the nation’s midsection is narrow, only about thirty miles wide. In order to avoid French military forces in this “waist,” the Viet Minh constructed pathways in neighboring Laos. This allowed continued movement of men and material southward before veering back into Vietnam.

Movement down The Trail slowed and stopped in the mid 1950s, only to resume at the end of the decade when North Vietnam decided to increase its assistance to local Communist forces fighting the South Vietnamese government. In December 1958, NVA forces crossed the border and took control of the corner of Laos adjacent to Vietnam’s Demilitarized Zone. The governments of both South Vietnam and Laos soon noticed the resumption of activity on The Trail. In 1959 South Vietnam military authorities, working with the Royal Laotian Government (RLG), established a small military outpost near the Lao-Vietnam border at Ban Houei Sane. The purpose was to keep an eye on Communist infiltration.[1]

This area of Laos was in the boondocks, at the very edge of RLG control. According to General Oudone Sananikone, former Laotian Army Chief of Staff, it was “wild, sparsely populated, deep jungle [which] had little practical importance to Laos.”[2] The RLG had two basic types of ground military units. The Bataillon d'Infanterie (BI) could be deployed to any province while the Bataillon Voluntaire (BV) were located in a particular province with the mission of local defense.[3] In January 1961 the newly formed Bataillon Voluntaire 33 (BV-33) settled into position at Tchepone on Route 9. In April a combined NVA and Pathet Lao (Laotian Communist) group attacked Tchepone , forcing BV-33 to retreat eastward toward the village of Ban Houei Sane. Here, assisted by South Vietnamese forces of the 1^st ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) Infantry Division, the Laotians constructed new defensive positions. In 1962 an agreement at Geneva required all foreign military forces to withdraw from Laos. The South Vietnamese left. The following year infiltration down the Ho Chi Minh Trail picked up again, and BV-33 assumed the role of Trail watchers.[4]

BV-33 increasingly found itself sitting on an island in the middle of hostile, NVA-controlled territory. From 1961-65 the garrison was supplied from the west by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) contract airplanes. By 1966 this became too risky as the North Vietnamese moved more antiaircraft weapons into Laos to protect the Trail. Aircraft began flying in from the other direction, from the base at Khe Sanh in South Vietnam, air dropping rice by the ton to the Laotian soldiers. Two ARVN officers were stationed with BV-33, and in 1967 Americans from Khe Sanh began training local tribesmen in unconventional warfare tactics.[5]

Always the war went on. All sides increased their forces on the battlefields in the South. By the beginning of 1968, US military strength in Vietnam totaled over 400,000 soldiers and Marines. Estimated enemy main force strength was over one quarter million, plus nearly as many irregulars and part-time guerrillas. Traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail increased to supply the Communist forces. 20,000 men were infiltrating monthly by the end of the year, up from 6,000-8,000 a few months earlier.[1][6] For the first nine months of 1967, an average of 480 trucks per month were sighted. By October this number rose to 1,116; in December, a whopping 6,315 trucks were seen coming down the Trail. The enemy had moved from the defensive to the offensive, and were on the move in all areas.[7] It was a busy time for BV-33.

For many years the Americans also monitored traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In 1962 a U. S. Army Special Forces “A” Team drove up from Da Nang to Khe Sanh, located on Route 9 fifteen miles from the Laotian border. They settled into abandoned French military positions. A Vietnamese engineering unit constructed a small airstrip. Contacts were made with the Laotians. In 1964 a BV-33 commander was killed when his vehicle struck a mine on Route 9 near Khe Sanh. [8]The Green Berets, working under the direction of the CIA, were reinforced in 1966 by the 1^st Battalion, 3^rd Marines. The Marine mission was to provide security for Khe Sanh, which was becoming crowded with Americans. Just before Christmas 1966, the Special Forces deployed further west along Route 9 to Lang Vei, putting them closer to the action in Laos and closer to BV-33. [9]

In mid-1967, Communist leaders in Hanoi gave their approval for a plan to launch a general offensive-general uprising. In October they decided to launch during the 1968 Tet holiday. In December the central military commission established a military command for the Route 9-Tri Thien Front, which included the area around Khe Sanh. The goal of the Route 9 Front during Tet was to destroy American forces and give support to the attack on Hue. NVA military strength was substantial and included four infantry divisions, one independent infantry regiment, five artillery regiments, three anti-aircraft regiments, four battalions of tanks, one battalion of engineers, and a number of local troops. Success of the plan depended on secrecy.[10]

Both sides considered the Laotian forces of BV-33 at Ban Houei Sane an important part of the allied intelligence gathering effort. In the summer of 1967 U.S. commanders planned to deploy long-range 175mm guns at Khe Sanh. The purpose of these guns included firing support for U.S. reconnaissance teams operating in Laos and for the support of BV-33. In the fall the South Vietnamese Strategic Technical Directorate made plans to send ARVN commandos to the area around Ban Houei Sane. Neither plan came to fruition. On January 21, 1968, the North Vietnamese Army began their attacks on Khe Sanh. As part of this effort, General Tran Qui Hai, the NVA commander of the at Khe Sanh Front, decided to put BV-33 out of the trail watching business. During the night of January 23, three battalions of the 24^th Regiment, 304^th NVA Division (veterans of Dien Bien Phu), backed by tanks, struck Ban Houei Sane.[11]

The U.S. 7^th Air Force Tactical Air Control Center in Saigon was responsible for aerial monitoring of the Khe Sanh area battlefield. In support of this mission, Forward Air Controllers (FACs) flew out of Da Nang and Ubon Air Bases to report on “all routes and trails leading into the Khe Sanh area.” FAC pilots were familiar with BV-33. They often landed at the camp’s small airstrip in order to visit with RLG Lieutenant Colonel Soulang Phetsampou, BV-33 commander, and his people. The FAC radio call sign for BV-33 was “Elephant” (some writers refer to BV-33 incorrectly as the “Royal Laotian Elephant Battalion”). Details of the NVA attack on BV-33 are sketchy. The best descriptions are provided by USAF Capt. Charles Rushford and other FACs who did their best to provide close air support to the Laotians under attack. [12]

For the NVA, bad weather was a good time to launch an attack; it restricted the ability of the Americans to provide air support. The weather at Ban Houei Sane during the early morning of January 24 was low overcast up to around 2,000 or 3,000 feet. A flareship tried to light up the battlefield as seven North Vietnamese tanks plus infantry forced their way through minefields surrounding BV-33’s position. LtCol. Soulang (“Elephant”) contacted the FAC circling overhead, shouted the NVA had breached the outer base perimeter and requested air strikes on the attacking enemy. The FAC was unable to coordinate strikes visually. All strikes had to be directed by the Marine radar bombing system located at Khe Sanh Combat Base. The FAC received coordinates from Elephant and relayed them to the Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) orbiting the battlefield area at a higher elevation. The ABCCC relayed the data to Khe Sanh. This system proved too cumbersome to be effective. The NVA were moving too rapidly to be targeted accurately by Khe Sanh radar. The FACs controlled two B-57 loaded with napalm. The bombers were unable to drop because ground targets could not be identified.

“We just had to sit up there, rather frustrated, and TPQ [Khe Sanh ground directed radar] to help them out. Just before dawn, Elephant reported that they were being overrun. I could hear the machine guns and mortars in the background as he talked rather sadly over the radio . . . .” [13]

After three hours of fighting, the BV-33 commander informed the Americans the enemy had overwhelmed his position. He decided to abandon his command post. Elephant contacted the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei by radio and requested helicopters be sent to evacuate his people. Helicopters were unavailable. The Laotians decided to move eastward down Route 9 in an attempt to reach Lang Vei, just over the border in South Vietnam. With the dawn the Laotians set out on foot. The group included 276 soldiers of BV-33, about 200 Meo troops, and 2,300 civilian refugees, some of whom were wives and children of the Laotian soldiers. At least 46 Laotians were taken prisoner by the NVA. Halfway to Lang Vei Elephant again requested helicopter support. An affirmative reply was given but no helicopters came. The column continued walking on Route 9. The weather cleared enough for the FACs to see the battle area. U.S. attack aircraft hit the abandoned command post in order to destroy any Communist forces loitering at Ban Houei Sane. Another FAC followed the progress of the Laotians on the ground, calling in strikes on a bridge after they had crossed in order to discourage NVA pursuit. The BV-33 airfield was struck hard. The Air Force decided it should be kept knocked out in order to ensure the North Vietnamese did not use if to launch air attacks against Khe Sanh.[14]

The ragged band crossed the border into South Vietnam and proceed another mile to Lang Vei. Special Forces Lieutenant Paul Longgear spotted the lead elements and greeted the Lao officer who appeared to be in charge. The Laotian wore tiger-striped trousers, a camouflaged shirt with American airborne wings with ranger tab, and carried a Soviet AK-47 rifle. “Who are you?” asked Longgear.[15] Although allies, the Americans did not fully trust the soldiers of BV-33. In fact, one Special Forces soldier, Sergeant Bill Steptoe, felt BV-33 troops were playing both sides of the fence. In 1966, Steptoe’s troops spotted what they thought were Russians, Chinese, and North Vietnamese right around BV-33 positions.[16]

Against the pleas of the Laotian lieutenant, Montagnard mercenaries working for the Green Berets disarmed the soldiers from Elephant as they arrived (the weapons were later returned). LtCol. Soulang described how his unit had been overrun in a battle with the North Vietnamese less than ten miles away. Soulang’s claim that tanks led the attack was met with disbelief by the Americans, who wondered why the Laotians’ weapons were so clean if they had fought the NVA. The FACs had made no mention of tanks, and tanks had never been used previously by the NVA.

The camp at Lang Vei was too small to hold the new arrivals. William Sullivan, U.S. ambassador to Laos, decided they should stay put, that evacuation would be militarily difficult given the tactical situation and their transfer to Khe Sanh would attract unwanted attention from the press. Soulang was told to move his people into defensive positions a thousand meters north of the Americans. No arms, ammunition, clothing, or entrenching tools to improve their positions were provided. The civilians were herded to a separate location about 800 meters to the east, just off Route 9.

BV-33 soldiers subsequently patrolled around Lang Vei with American Special Forces.[17] Later on January 24 a FAC spotted five tanks within five kilometers of the border. Air strikes destroyed one and two were seen moving west down Route 9, using trees for cover.[18] On January 30, NVA Private Luong Dinh Du walked pass sleeping Montagnard guards and surrendered to the Americans. When asked about tanks, Luong claimed he had heard the clanking of tracks but had not seen tanks personally. Their skepticism evaporating, the Americans requested air delivery of a hundred LAWs, light anti-tank weapons. A few were test fired. Camp defenses were improved. The NVA continued shelling Khe Sanh. With increasing intensity, mortar rounds began falling on Lang Vei.[19]

The radio call sign for the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp was “Spunky Hanson.” Shortly after midnight on February 7, Lang Vei reported it was under attack from “a large enemy force supported by tanks and flame throwers.” Again, the weather was bad. Spunky Hanson spoke to the FAC flying overhead:

We have tanks in the area! We have tanks in the area! I have one tank on top of my TOC at this time, there’s another tank trying to enter the gate, coming into the compound, and I think there’s another one coming down the road. Forget about the one on top of the TOC, but see if you can hit the one coming through the gate, and the one coming down the road! [20]

That was the last contact between the FAC and Spunky Hanson. By dawn the enemy had overrun the camp, trapping the Special Forces in their command bunker. A Special Forces NCO assigned to BV-33, Sergeant First Class Eugene Ashley, urged the Laotians to attempt a rescue, but they were pinned down by NVA machine gun fire. LtCol. Soulang initially refused to become involved but finally relented under Ashley’s insistence. Two platoons were assigned to assist the Americans. The BV-33 soldiers were reluctant to advance against the NVA; after closing in, they broke and ran. Sgt. Ashley claimed he practically had to threaten the Laotians with his weapon in order to get them to rally. Five times this force tried to make its way into the camp at Lang Vei. On the fifth try Ashley was killed (he was awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor).[21]

The Air Force delivered explosive bombs, napalm, and 20mm cannon fire against the enemy in an attempt to break up the assault. A 50-man Special Forces relief force was sent by helicopter from Khe Sanh with orders to link up with BV-33 and make a raid on the camp. Friendly forces from within the camp escaped from their the command bunker and took evasive action. The Khe Sanh relief force landed at the BV-33 site about 0500 hours and moved toward the Special Forces compound, linking up with the Americans who had escaped. Rallying occurred at the BV-33 compound, the sole friendly position in the area not under NVA attack. The Americans were evacuated by helicopter to Khe Sanh. At 0530 hours, LtCol. Soulang requested helicopter evacuation. Aircraft sufficient to move 40 Laotians arrived. Having lost 26 soldiers to NVA fire and U.S. air strikes, the Laotians decided it was time to leave Lang Vei. Soulang and part of the group began the eight kilometer walk down Route 9 to the Marine base at Khe Sanh. Others decided to return to Laos.[22] Many of this latter group made their way back to friendly lines; some made contact with U.S. personnel in Laos.

Soulang, his men, and their camp followers were right to have a feeling of déjà vu as they approached the American base at Khe Sanh. The Laotian troops and refugees (by now including Vietnamese Montagnards from the immediate area) posed a huge problem for U.S. commanders. The NVA might use them as a shield to attack the base, or may have planted agents among the crowds. There was insufficient air transport to bring food to them, or fly them to Laos. When the colonel and 74 of his men arrived at Khe Sanh they were disarmed and put into craters outside the perimeter, guarded by Marines. No food was issued. Soulang complained his people were being treated more like prisoners of war than allies. Although their weapons were returned on February 8, hey were still not allowed inside the base. The NVA continued to attack with rockets, artillery and mortars. The Laotian refugees “feared that they would die at Khe Sanh and preferred to die in Laos rather than Vietnam.”[23] On February 10 they started back down Route 9 toward Laos, from whence they came. Many were killed or forced into labor by the NVA. Some simply disappeared.

The next day LtCol. Soulang and 113 of his men were flown to Da Nang aboard a C-130. Again they were disarmed by the Americans, but this time they were given food and clothing by Air Force personnel. From Da Nang Soulang and some of his officers flew to Saigon. At the Laotian embassy arrangements were made for repatriation to Laos. On February 15 the remaining men of BV-33 flew to Savannakhet via Royal Laotian Air Force C-47 transport.[24]

Although the Laotians were gone, the North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese, and Americans continued to fight at Khe Sanh for many weeks. Thousands died. But that is another story.

Peter Brush

408 St. Francis Avenue

Nashville, TN 37205

For additional reading, see

Warren A. Trest, Khe Sanh (Operation Niagra) 22 January – 31 March (Christiansburg, VA : Dalley Book Service, 1997).

John Prados and Ray Stubbe, Valley of Decision (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991