Fragging in Vietnam
© Peter Brush, 2010

In October, 1970, the 3d Battalion, 1^st Marine Regiment was engaged in anti-infiltration operations in the Rocket Belt, an area of 500-plus square kilometers around the Da Nang Airbase. Company L occupied bunkers at an outpost on Hill 190, west of Da Nang. Assigned to guard duty on the evening of 23 October, Private Gary A. Hendricks settled in to his position on the perimeter and made himself comfortable. Sergeant Richard L. Tate was the sergeant of the guard. When Tate discovered Hendricks sleeping on post he gave Tate a reprimand but took no further action. One day later, shortly after midnight, Private Hendricks dropped a fragmentation grenade into the air vent of Sergeant Tate’s bunker. The grenade landed on Tate’s stomach and blew his legs off, resulting in death. Two other sergeants in the bunker were injured by the blast. Tate, married with three children, had but three weeks remaining on his tour of duty. Hendricks was charged with murder. He confessed and was convicted by general court martial.[1] Fragging was the name given to the murder or attempted murder of officers and non-commissioned officers in Vietnam. In addition to Tate’s murder, the U.S. Army reported 209 cases of fragging in 1970.[2] This article examines the history, causes, extent, and consequences of fragging in the Vietnam War.

Although grenades in various forms have been used in warfare for over a thousand years, modern-style small-percussion hand grenades were first employed on a large scale by European armies at the beginning of the last century. American soldiers have assaulted their superiors by fragging in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War, although at a much lower level than in Vietnam. Broadly defined, fragging includes assaults using explosive devices by soldiers against their own officers and sergeants, as opposed to enemy attacks. The practice of fragging was named after the weapon of choice: the M-26, M61, or M67 fragmentation hand grenade, standard issue to U.S. forces in Vietnam. Unlike rifles and pistols, grenades were not assigned to individuals by serial number. Once exploded, grenades leave no traceable ballistic evidence.

In America’s earlier wars of the twentieth century, fraggings (and similar homicides by gunfire) usually occurred in combat situations. Officers deemed incompetent, overly aggressive, or otherwise considered a danger would be killed by enlisted men under their command while engaged with the enemy. Fragging of this sort also occurred in Vietnam. Journalist Eugene Linden, in a 1972 Saturday Review article, describes the practice of “bounty hunting” whereby enlisted men would pool money which would be paid to a soldier who killed an officer or sergeant they considered dangerous.^{^[3]} One example of this bounty hunting was connected to the famous Battle of Hamburger Hill in May, 1969. After suffering over 400 casualties in taking the hill, the soldiers of the 101^st Airborne Division were ordered to withdraw. Shortly thereafter, the army underground newspaper in Vietnam GI Says publically offered a $10,000 bounty on Lt. Col. Weldon Honeycutt, the very aggressive officer who led the attack. Several attempts were made on Honeycutt’s life; all were unsuccessful.[4]

There are no official Pentagon fragging statistics before 1969, the year U.S. Vietnam troop strength peaked and withdrawals began. When it became clear the US was not pursuing a military victory in Vietnam, many soldiers became less aggressive, not wanting to be the last to die in a war that would not be won. Fragging and the threat of fragging were means by which enlisted men could discourage their superiors from showing enthusiasm for combat. After Hamburger Hill, an army major noted, “Another Hamburger Hill,” (i.e., another hard-fought, high casualty infantry assault), “is definitely out.”[5]

As the war wore on, more fraggings took place in secure rear areas. According to Marine Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., the morale, discipline, and battle worthiness of the U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam were, with a few exceptions, worse than at any time in the twentieth century, and possibly in the history of the United States.[6] An unnamed officer quoted in Newsweek remarked, "Vietnam has become a poison in the veins of the U.S. Army."[7] The Pentagon showed a great reluctance to discuss publicly the issue of fragging. A search of several prominent American newspapers shows the first use of the word “fragging” in The Washington Post in January, 1971, in a story about withdrawing from Vietnam.

Fragging became a political concern in April, 1971, when Democratic leader Mike Mansfield of Montana raised the issue on the floor of the Senate. Mansfield related details of the death of First Lieutenant Thomas A. Dellwo, of Choteau, Montana, killed by a fragmentation grenade on March 15, 1971 while asleep in his billet at Bien Hoa. The death of Dellwo, a married 24 year old West Point graduate who wanted to be a career soldier, was especially senseless: he was not the intended victim. Mansfield wondered what failure of order and discipline within our Armed Forces produced an atmosphere that resulted in 209 cases of fragging in 1970. According to Mansfield, fragging was an outgrowth of the mistaken and tragic war in Vietnam. Another senator noted he had recently asked a judge on the Court of Military Appeals if he knew what “fragging” meant. “No,” said the judge, after the meaning was explained to him, “but unhappily we all know about the act because these cases are coming through the military court system in great numbers.”[8] The Pentagon confirmed there were 209 fragging incidents in 1970 which resulted in 34 deaths. This was more than twice the number of incidents for 1969 -- 96, which resulted in 37 deaths.[9] Fragging incidents increased in spite of troop withdrawals: the first eleven months of 1971 saw 215 incidents that resulted in 12 more deaths. As of July 1972, when the last American soldiers were leaving Vietnam, there had been 551 reported incidents of fragging, which resulted in 86 killed and over 700 injured. These Pentagon figures only include incidents involving explosive devices. Given the greater availability of firearms, the total number of assaults on commanders by enlisted men probably reached into the thousands, according to historian David Cortright.[10] Military lawyers estimated only about ten percent of fragging incidents ended up in court.[11]

Mansfield’s attempt to introduce fragging into the American political vocabulary was successful. In September, 1971, the House or Representatives conducted hearings on Defense Department appropriations for 1972. Texas Congressman George Mahon, Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, called three army generals as witnesses to discuss the problem of the deteriorating morale and discipline in the U.S. Army. The first witness was General Bruce Palmer, Jr., Army Vice Chief of Staff. Palmer acknowledged the problems of the army, including fragging, could no longer be minimized and thanked the committee for giving him the opportunity to discuss them. Palmer noted some of the army’s then current problems had ocurred in previous wars, but that widespread drug use and fragging were new phenomena. Palmer provided statistics on the incidence of fragging. He pointed out the increase in the number of incidents could be attributed at least in part to increased awareness of the problem and subsequent increased reporting. When asked if fraggings followed any noticeable patterns, Palmer replied that since the number of incidents was rising while the number of deaths and injuries were decreasing, many incidents might be explained in terms of intimidation or “just plain horseplay” rather than cases of deliberate murder. He confirmed the attacks did not seem to be racially motivated but rather attacks against “the man in authority, black or white.” The army in Vietnam, under General Creighton Abrams, “has really cracked down.” The next witness, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Lt. Gen. Walter Kerwin, gave the committee details on the specific legal charges, types of courts martial, and sentences awarded to fragging offenders. When a congressman asked General Palmer about incidents of officers being shot by their own men, another congressman ended the discussion by noting “They have been shooting second lieutenants in the back for a thousand years.”[12]

Profiles of Vietnam war fragging victims are straightforward: they were assaults by explosive devices (which excludes rifles, pistols, and knives); they were officers and noncommissioned officers of superior rank to their attackers and were discharging their command responsibilities at the time of the attack; the attack was at a distance, and not a face-to-face assault; and the incident occurred outside the United States (particularly in South Vietnam).[13]

Since most fragging incidents did not end up in the court system, it is more difficult to establish a profile of perpetrators. However, due to a study conducted at the US Disciplinary Barracks (USDB) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, some general characteristics can be described. Of 850 inmates in the USDB population, 28 offenders who met the above profile were identified, based on details in their courts martial transcripts. On average, they are 20 years old and had 28 months on active duty. About 20 percent were African American, and about 7 percent were draftees. The assaults occurred at night, and with little planning beyond talking to others about intent. Most did nothing to avoid capture. Captains and first sergeants were the most common victims, which is consistent with the command structure at the company and battery level. Seventy-five percent of the perpetrators were involved in a verbal or physical disagreement with their victims. In terms of motive, the victims were seen as having somehow denied the offenders of something desired, such as promotions or transfers. The victims were perceived as a threat to the offenders. Only two offenders claimed race was a factor. Most were loners who had enlisted in the service and supported the war. Their educational level was low. Most were assigned to support units, were assigned to jobs for which they had not been trained, and reported little job satisfaction. They felt they had been scapegoated and showed little or no remorse for their crimes. Almost all of these men (87.5%) were intoxicated on a wide assortment of substances at the time of the fragging. According to the authors of the study, the easy access and use of drugs was an essential factor in the assaults. Drugs were more common in Vietnam than in other wars, and drugs tended to reduce any inhibitions the offenders may have had about assaulting their superiors.[14] Although the study involved only a small fraction of the total number of soldiers who participated in fragging incidents, it does offer insight into the characteristics of those who were willing to engage in this violent and unusual crime.

Fragging had consequences for the US military in Vietnam far beyond the number of actual victims. Potential victims found themselves in a difficult place, caught between the hostility and frustration of the men they commanded and the expectations of their superior officers. Officers and non-commissioned officers were expected to inspire their men, to be aggressive, and to initiate and succeed in combat. Yet to do so was to assume the risk of being fragged. For every actual fragging incident there were many threats of fragging, such as the surreptitious placement of a grenade or grenade pin, or the detonation of a non-lethal gas or smoke grenade in the potential victims quarters or work areas. According to Army Judge Captain Barry Steinberg, who presided over fragging courts martial, once an officer has been threatened with fragging, he is intimidated to the point of being “useless to the military because he can no longer carry out orders essential to the functioning of the Army.”[15] Journalist Linden’s 1972 investigation concluded fragging, both actual and threatened, is so powerful an influence that virtually all officers and NCOs have to take it into account before giving orders to men in their command. Officers who survive fragging attempts may not know the identity of their attackers, and live in fear the attacks will be repeated. Linden describes a lieutenant who refused to obey an order from a superior officer to assault an enemy position in the Mekong Delta. This lieutenant subsequently learned his men had considered killing him for being overly aggressive and hence dangerous to them. The men decided to abandon their plan upon learning of the lieutenant’s refusal to attack the enemy.[16] Though spared a possible fragging, the lieutenant had to face the consequences of disobeying an order.

By May, 1971, overall US troop strength in Vietnam had been cut in half. An even greater percentage (70%) of combat troops had been withdrawn, leaving a greater percentage of the remaining forces in rear areas. Fraggings (and heroin use) continued to rise as the combat role declined. Army Secretary Stanley Resor said there was a drive by the military to get away from the word “fragging” and use “attempted murder” instead, so as not to minimize the crime. According to Resor, more soldiers were coming forward with evidence of fraggings, and more prospective victims were being tipped off.[17]

The Army attempted to deal with the problem of fragging in various ways. Since large-scale offensive operations were avoided, American forces were limited to small unit patrols protecting US bases. In many units, personal weapons were taken from everyone except those on patrol or guard duty, and fragmentation grenades were taken from everyone.[18] On August 12, 1972, the last US combat battalion stood down. In 1971, in his address to the Senate, Senator Mansfield said “I feel deeply . . . that the only solution [to the fragging problem] is the total dissolution of our involvement in Indochina.”[19] Mansfield was essentially correct; the Army solved its fragging problem only by leaving Vietnam.

America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will exceed the Vietnam War in duration. In Vietnam, fragging was both a cause and a consequence of the breakdown in morale and discipline that plagued US forces in the latter part of the war. Today’s professional, all-volunteer army has avoided these problems in spite of formidable challenges. As we have seen, fragging attacks have occurred in America’s wars since grenades became widely available. In 2003, Sgt. Hasan Akbar of the 101^st Airborne Division killed two officers when he threw grenades in their tents in Kuwait. In 2005, Staff Sgt. Alberto Martinez killed two officers by setting off grenades and a Claymore mine in their room at one of Saddam Hussein's former palaces in Iraq. With but two incidents in two wars, the practice of fragging as a serious military problem has been relegated to history – the history of the Vietnam War – from whence it came.

Back to top

Back to articles