In 1993 a monument
was dedicated in Arlington National Cemetery to the Marines who fought at
Khe Sanh in 1968, arguably the longest and most bitterly contested battle
of the Vietnam War. It was not only Marines who faced the NVA at Khe Sanh,
however. The defense of the embattled outpost was very much a combined effort.
The first
American troops at Khe Sanh wore the green berets of the Army Special Forces.
The first Marine unit of significant size was the 1st Battalion, Ist Marines,
arriving in April 1966. That summer, members of Naval Mobile Construction
Battalion 10 (Seabees) improved the existing airstrip with aluminum matting. By
January 1968 Khe Sanh combat base was the home of the 26th Marine Regiment (Reinforced).
Detachments of four Seabee battalions maintained the airstrip. Besides elements
of the 5th Special Forces Group, various Army units provided artillery and
communications support. U.S. Air Force detachments operated the aerial port and
provided other combat support services. The last infantry battalion to arrive
before the Tet Offensive of 1968 was the ARVN 37th Ranger Battalion.
After the NVA
struck the base on January 21, 1968, a combination of air support and firepower
proved key to the defense of Khe Sanh. Before the siege was officially declared
over 77 days later, nearly 90,000 tons of bombs had been dropped by U.S. Air
Force, Navy and Marine aircraft, as well as the VNAE To the forces on the
ground, air support meant more than the massive number of Boeing B-52 and
tactical bomber sorties. Aerial supply was crucial to the defense of Khe Sanh,
and the U.S. Army 109th Quartermaster Company (Air Delivery) played a vital
role.
The 109th
Quartermaster Company had its beginnings in 1914, when its predecessor was
organized as a unit of the Regular Army. After serving in New Guinea in World
War II, the unit was deactivated on Okinawa in 1946, reactivated during the
Korean War, and finally, in 1955, assumed the Air Delivery designation and was
assigned to Fort Lee, Va., during the Vietnam War era. Practically all the men
of the 109th at that time were either jump qualified or completing the jump
qualification course at Fort Bragg, N.C. Many of the NCOs were veterans of
airborne combat operations in World War II and Korea. The unit's first
sergeant, Master Sgt. Thurman L. Weaks, was involved in parachute operations
from the very beginning. In 1941 Weaks was one of 41 men selected by the Army
to test the viability of parachuting soldiers into battle zones. Later, some
veterans of the 109th participated in the delivery of supplies to French forces
in the Plain of Jars during the First Indochina War. During the Cuban missile
crisis the unit moved from Fort Lee to Opa Locka, Fla.
The 109th's
mission was to provide parachute packing, temporary storage and rigging of
supplies and equipment for aerial drop by aircraft of all the services. In
addition, the 109th was to render technical assistance in the recovery and
evacuation of airdrop equipment. At full strength the unit would be capable of
preparing 200 tons of material per day for delivery by free, high velocity or
low-velocity drop techniques.
During the early
part of 1965 about one dozen personnel of the 109th were sent on temporary duty
to Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, where they assisted Air Force personnel
developing an air delivery technique called the low-altitude parachute
extraction system (LAPES). Using this system, while a cargo plane flew a few
feet above ground level, a drogue parachute would be released, pulling
palletized cargo out of the aircraft and onto the drop zone. An alternative
method was the ground proximity extraction system (GPES), in which cargo was
yanked from the aircraft by a hook that snagged a cable traversing the runway.
In September
1965 the 109th was stationed at Fort Campbell, Ky., under the operational
control of the 101st Airborne Division. The company did not participate in
regular exercises or maneuvers-their primary mission was supporting U.S. Air
Force crew training and consisted of rigging heavy drop loads, assisting in
loading materials onto Lockheed C-130 aircraft, providing personnel to fly with
the aircraft, and recovering loads and equipment from the drop zones.
LAPES/GPES training continued during the night. Looking back on the night
training, one former 109th officer feels missions were flown in darkness due to
the secret nature of the LAPES system, but another believes it was done that
way because LAPES was still an unauthorized system; they had to avoid public
disclosure. During the first six months of 1966, the 109th completed nearly 600
training missions. These exercises ceased in June 1966, when the 109th received
overseas movement orders.
In July 1966 the
main body of the 109th embarked on General John N. Pope, headed for Vietnam. A
20man detachment flew to Cam Ranh Bay to begin advance preparations for the
unit. The main body arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on August 12, setting up on the Cam
Ranh Peninsula about four miles north of the airfield. The 109th was responsible
for the maintenance and storage of approximately 5,000 cargo parachutes to be
used in support of a variety of contingency plans. Additionally, the unit had
adopted materials from the Air Force to support LAPES-type missions.
The summer and
fall of 1966 saw the buildup of large NVA units in the area along the DMZ. In
response, the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, General William C.
Westmoreland, ordered Marine units northward to meet that threat. Positions
were established just south of the DMZ to block NVA infiltration. Khe Sanh was
the western anchor of this defensive line, and Westmoreland was determined to
hold the base. The original airstrip was a 1,500-foot runway built by the
French, and it was later extended and improved by engineers who installed World
War II-era steel matting. Navy Seabees undertook a crash program to upgrade the
base's airstrip. The mission of the first large Marine unit at Khe Sanh was
directly linked to the airfield, and the work of the Seabees was delayed by the
arrival of this Marine security force. In October 1966 Seabees closed the
airstrip and installed 1,385 bundles of aluminum runway matting.
In November,
with the 109th fully operational, airdrops in support of combat operations were
made that included more than 100 tons of aircraft fuel and nearly 20 tons of
combat rations. These were heavy drop missions in a variety of locations
throughout Vietnam. During one emergency resupply mission in December more than
40 tons of supplies was delivered, and two men of the 109th parachuted in with
the supplies to act as recovery supervisors. In February 1967 the 109th
parachuted supplies to the Light Infantry Brigade and 173rd Airborne Brigade
during Operation Junction City. Again, 109th personnel parachuted in to assist
in recovering loads. During 1967, having trained ARVN personnel in rigging and
air delivery, several men from the 109th received authorization to wear the
ARVN parachute badge on their uniforms.
Khe Sanh was
proving difficult to resupply. Commanders endeavored to keep a 15-day stock of
all kinds of supplies on hand, but during December and January one senior
Marine officer reported there were only six days when the weather was good
enough for aerial resupply missions. Rations and fuel were occasionally reduced
to less than one day's supply.
Rain made road
travel almost impossible, and in April 1967 NVA sappers cut the only highway to
Khe Sanh from the east to prevent overland reinforcements. An enemy regiment
moved onto Hills 861 and 881, northwest of the base, and built fortified
positions. The NVA planned to launch a regiment-sized ground assault from the
west and seize the airfield, but Marine attacks on April 28 drove the enemy
from their hill positions before they could launch an offensive. In the bitter
fighting that followed, the Marines lost 155 killed and 425 wounded. NVA losses
were 940 confirmed killed.
The 109th began
experiencing problems because of Westmoreland's policy of limiting tours of
duty for Army personnel in Vietnam to 12 months. In July 1967 Major Albert B.
Lanier assumed command. Within one month the 109th lost more than 75 percent of
its men through rotations, including all its experienced warrant officers.
Nevertheless, the unit continued to function.
In August 1967
LAPES test drops were conducted, even though the system was still considered to
be experimental. Major Lanier instituted changes that improved the LAPES
technique. With this new capability, the fortunes of the 109th and the Marines
at Khe Sanh were about to converge.
The airfield at
Khe Sanh was still in poor condition despite the Seabees' efforts. Lockheed
C-130 cargo planes had a landing weight of almost 60 tons. Rainfall had
saturated the ground, and when a heavily laden C-130 landed, water was forced
up from the soggy ground, causing the runway to collapse in a number of places.
On August 17, 1967, the runway was closed for repairs. Seabees removed the
metal surface, laid down a base of crushed rock, coated it with asphalt and
replanked the surface. Since Khe Sanh was dependent on aerial supply because of
its isolated location, it was essential that the airstrip be returned to
operational status quickly. In early September the 109th used LAPES techniques
to carry out the emergency resupply of more than 550 tons of construction
materials for the Marines at Khe Sanh. Army riggers were assisted by the Marine
Corps Air Delivery Platoon, a 33-man unit whose members were graduates of the
Army parachute school at Fort Benning, Ga., and the parachute rigging school at
Fort Lee. The Marines used an M-48 tank to drag the seven-ton LAPES loads from
the extraction zone to where they were needed.
The 109th
delivered supplies using LAPES and container delivery system (CDS) techniques
on 27 of 30 days from the end of September to the end of October. The 109th
also dropped supplies to the nearby Special Forces camp at Lang Vei as well as
a 1st Cavalry Division position on Hill 63 near An Truong.
On September 3,
1967, the unit dispatched 53 riggers with LAPES and CDS equipment to the air
base at Da Nang to provide direct support for the Marines at Khe Sanh. A small
number of Marines at Da Nang provided manpower for the labor-intensive
air-delivery missions, loading supplies by hand into containers and palletizing
supplies so that Army riggers, who did the bulk of the work, could prepare the
loads for aerial delivery.
On October 15
the 109th lost one of its members when a C-130 crashed at Khe Sanh, killing
Spc. 4 Charles L. Baney. He had been on board the aircraft as an inspector, to
ensure the load was properly rigged.
By the end of
1967, American intelligence had learned that large numbers of NVA forces were
deploying in the area around Khe Sanh. One unit was the NVA 304th Division,
which had been involved in defeating the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and
which included infantry, artillery and tanks. General Westmoreland estimated
the division's size at between 15,000 and 20,000 men.
This buildup of
enemy forces caused the U.S. command to conclude that reinforcing Khe Sanh was
the only feasible option. Westmoreland ruled out abandoning the area because to
do so would serve the NVA plan to seize the two northern provinces of South
Vietnam. Additionally, the fortified allied positions along the DMZ and a
presence at Khe Sanh would block the NVA from bringing the war into the
populated coastal plain. Most of Westmoreland's advisers concurred with his
decision to reinforce Khe Sanh. Those who did not were primarily French
officers who had been at Dien Bien Phu when their outpost was overrun.
In fact,
Westmoreland wanted to fight the NVA. The area around Khe Sanh was relatively
unpopulated by civilians, a situation that would allow unrestricted use of U.S.
firepower. Khe Sanh would be reinforced on a limited basis, because gradual
reinforcement would not scare off the NVA, and only as many Marines would be
brought in as could be resupplied by air. By January 1968 the allied force at
Khe Sanh totaled about 6,000 men. On January 21 the siege of Khe Sanh began.
At approximately
0530 hours on the 21st, NVA gunners scored a hit on the main ammunition dump.
Ninety-eight percent of the dump's contents-1,500 tons of munitions-was
destroyed in the ensuing explosions. This resulted in an immediate request for
"tactical emergency air supply."
Available U.S.
aircraft included C-130s (each with a 20-ton payload), Fairchild C-123s (8-ton
payload) and de Havilland C-7As (3-ton payload). The C-130s were the logical
choice to quickly replenish ammunition stocks, but shrapnel from the ammunition
dump explosion, which covered half the runway, precluded their use. C-123s,
with shorter takeoff and landing requirements, delivered 130 tons of supplies
in the next 36 hours, flying and unloading even at night by the light of Marine
artillery flares. By January 23 the runway was cleared of debris, permitting
the return of the C-130s. In a single day, January 27, Air Force C-130s
delivered 310 tons of cargo. Both sides then began to settle in for a fight of
indeterminable duration.
NVA gunners
continued to fire rockets, mortars and artillery into the base. The Marines on
the ground and the air transport crews both faced great danger. On February 11
a Marine KC-130 was hit by enemy fire during its approach. The pilot managed to
land the aircraft, but it burst into flames, and six men burned to death.
Additionally, through February 10, seven Air Force C-130s were hit by gunfire
or shrapnel. A C-130 struck by enemy fire on February 11 was stuck for two days
on the runway before it could be flown out. Mechanics at Da Nang later counted
242 holes in the aircraft.
Air Force
commanders felt that the C- 130s, at $2.5 million each, were too valuable to
risk unnecessarily. C-123s and C-7As lost enough speed upon landing to allow
them to make a 90-degree turn to the unloading area. C-130s required a longer
roll after landing, forcing them to proceed to the end of the runway and turn
around before going to the unloading area. This situation gave NVA gunners a
considerable amount of time in which to target them. Consequently, the use of
C- 130s was severely restricted. Between February 12 and the end of March, Air
Force C-130s landed at the Marine base on only four days.
The smaller
C-123s and C-7As proved unable to deliver an adequate volume of supplies. A
combination of NVA gunners and bad weather did not permit a sufficient number
of landings of these aircraft. In order to survive, the Marines would have to
be supplied in the same manner as the French had been at Dien Bien Phu-by
parachute. C-123 and C-7A landings would continue because some cargo could be
delivered by no other means. This cargo included incoming passengers, medical
supplies and special munitions. Landings were also necessary in order to
evacuate casualties.
Bulk cargo such
as ammunition, rations and fuel were delivered using the CDS method. In this
system, tractor-trailer drivers received loads from the supply depot, then
delivered them to the rigger line. Forklifts then transported the loads into
rigger line tents. Energy absorption material was placed on pallets, which were
placed on a platform, positioned on conveyor rollers. A layer of plywood went
on the prepared pallet, topped off by the supplies. Netting secured the cargo
to the pallet, and a parachute was attached to the finished load. The line
moved quite quickly-each rigger had to be ready to accomplish his particular
task as the load rolled into his area. Prepared loads went back onto trucks,
were hauled to the runway area, then loaded onto waiting aircraft. Ammunition
had to be rigged within the confines of the ammunition supply point.
A C-130 could
transport 14 to 16 of those loads. Six hundred feet above the drop zone, the
restraints holding the loads were cut. The pilot raised the nose of the plane
and gunned the engines. The cargo moved rearward on floor rollers and then out
of the plane. A small parachute was attached to the aircraft's anchor line
cable. This cable deployed the large cargo parachute that carried the bundle to
the ground. Riggers of the 109th often flew with the cargo planes to ensure
proper delivery.
The normal
source of supplies for the Marines at Khe Sanh was Da Nang. As the situation
worsened, however, it became clear that Da Nang alone lacked the rigging and
dropping capabilities necessary to sustain the beleaguered base. Resupply
missions also originated at Tan Son Nhut, Cam Ranh Bay, Tuy Hoa and Nha Trang.
Most C-130 flights originated at Cam Ranh Bay, headquarters of the 109th.
The riggers of
the 109th geared up to meet the challenge of Khe Sanh. Initially, riggers at
Cam Ranh Bay worked three days and two nights continuously without rest. This
was followed by shifts of 24 hours on duty followed by a six-hour rest break.
It was exhausting work at the point of origin. Sometimes it was also dangerous
at the point of delivery. Aircraft were fired upon as they made their
approaches and departures. Transports sitting on the ground were shelled in
attempts to destroy them. Men unloading and retrieving supplies were harassed
by shelling and by recoilless-rifle fire. Each morning the Marines swept the
drop zone for enemy mines and snipers.
Occasionally
pallets landed in nearby trees or minefields. On February 21 a LAPES-loaded
C-130 inadvertently hit the ground. Its load broke apart, killing one man and
injuring another. Three weeks later, as a load platform deplaned, the parachute
was cut free prematurely and the load crashed into a bunker, killing one man.
One week later a container drop landed in a bunker area, causing five
casualties. The LAPES loads were dropped outside the main base perimeter. Had
the loads been dropped within the perimeter, the airstrip would need to have
been closed during drops because personnel and equipment could have been
injured by falling loads. The drop zone (DZ) was a 300-square-yard area 1,000
yards beyond the end of the runway.
The security of
the DZ was a critical concern of the Marines. Because it was situated beyond
the base perimeter, it was unguarded each night, and engineers had to sweep the
area each morning for enemy mines. Bundles could not be left in the drop area
overnight for fear the NVA would booby-trap them. Supplies were usually
parachuted into this DZ accurately, but some drops drifted into enemy
territory. Loads that landed in the wrong spot were destroyed by airstrikes or
Marine artillery to prevent the enemy from using them.
The constant
enemy shelling forced the Marines to dig for protection, and they requested an
emergency supply of large timbers for bunker construction. Because of the size
and handling difficulties involved in delivering the timbers, low-level
extraction was used.
On February 16 a
C-130 loaded with timbers flew down the Khe Sanh runway. The pilot maintained
an airspeed of 130 knots at an altitude of five feet. A parachute, constrained
to a 48-inch diameter, was attached to the load and projected out the rear of
the cargo door. At a predetermined point, a crew member activated an electrical
device that allowed the parachute to open to a diameter of 28 feet. This sudden
force broke the restraints attaching the timber load to the floor of the
aircraft. The plane remained airborne, essentially flying out from underneath
the palletized timbers, which coasted to a stop close to the proposed bunker
construction sites. It was one of 52 LAPES deliveries made during the siege of
Khe Sanh.
LAPES was a good
solution to the problems posed by the precision delivery of bulky cargo loads.
Use of this system on a larger scale, however, was not possible due to the lack
of sufficient LAPES components in the airlift supply system. Marine commanders
also expressed concern about damage to the runway from the heavy LAPES pallets.
The pallets gouged the planking, and some of the metal sections were so bent
that they could not be repaired. LAPES deliveries continued until April 2,
1968, though they became less frequent. The shortage of components such as
electrical firing devices for the parachutes and special steel pallets caused
logistics specialists to turn to GPES.
During the
mid-1960s, GPES was considered inferior to LAPES because it required heavy
ground equipment at the point of delivery. It was deemed suitable for the
particular situation at Khe Sanh, however, because the loads came to rest in a
precise spot, with no danger of runaway pallets. While GPES gear was rushed
from the United States, aircrews practiced the delivery technique at Naha Air
Base in Okinawa.
In all, 15 loads
of cargo, mostly construction materials, were delivered to Khe Sanh using GPES.
A C-130 would land and roll down the runway, the plane's cargo pallet attached
to a boom with a hook at the free end. The rear cargo door would be open. The
airplane rolled across an arresting cable that traversed the runway and was
moored to the ground at each end. The cable engaged the hook and yanked the
cargo out of the plane. The pilot then applied power and took off. Aircrews
appreciated the safety of the cable-extraction system: the cargo could not be
released too late or too soon, there was no parachute to malfunction, and the
loads were easier to recover quickly. A single set per flight of GPES hooks,
bands and clevises could be easily retrieved and placed aboard the next plane
that landed. LAPES parachutes, on the other hand, had to be stripped from the
individual cargo loads, bundled up and placed on the next aircraft-a process
that was more time-consuming.
American
logistics personnel showed impressive ingenuity during the airlift. The
combination of container drop, parachute and ground extraction delivery
techniques meant the garrison could hold out indefinitely. Large-scale NVA
infantry movements near the base were constantly disrupted by allied air and
artillery firepower.
From January 21
to April 8, Air Force C-130s made 273 landings at Khe Sanh, 496 container
drops, 52 LAPES and 15 GPES deliveries. These accounted for more than 90
percent of the 12,430 tons of supplies delivered by the Air Force. More than
8,000 tons was delivered by parachute. As early as March 15 the number of
supply drops into Khe Sanh exceeded the total for all of Vietnam until then.
On April 1 Army
Airmobile units working in concert with Marine infantry and engineers began
Operation Pegasus to reestablish the overland supply link to Khe Sanh. This
force linked up with the base on April 8. The men began salvage work, including
retrieval of ground proximity extraction gear and parachutes. The Marine
logistics support area was allowed to deteriorate. By July the base at Khe Sanh
had been dismantled and abandoned.
The Marines who
had been at Khe Sanh went on operations elsewhere. Mobile Army assets created
for Pegasus gave the U.S. command the opportunity to venture into the A Shau
Valley. In nine days the combination of Air Force C-130s and riggers of the
109th delivered 2,300 tons of supplies in 165 drops. On April 30 they dropped
380 tons, exceeding the March 18 maximum single-day airdrop at Khe Sanh.
The Army riggers
continued to provide invaluable service throughout the conflict in Southeast
Asia. The Da Nang platoon of the 109th rigged 350 tons of fuel, rations and
ammunition for the 1971 invasion of Laos. Another air delivery unit aided in
dropping 4,853 tons of supplies in 369 sorties into An Loc during the 1972
Easter Offensive, enabling the defenders at An Loc to hold their ground.
Air Force and
Army leaders never embraced extraction delivery methods with much enthusiasm.
It was Westmoreland who ensured that the delivery systems were available for
use in Vietnam.
Except in
special circumstances, airdrop delivery was considered superior to extraction.
Problems associated with airdrop included loads damaged or lost and the need to
recover and return parachutes. When practical, delivery by helicopter was
favored over delivery by parachute. But Khe Sanh was a special case. It would
have been impossible to resupply the base by using slow-moving helicopters.
Once encircled by the NVA, there was nothing the Marines could do in that
remote outpost except dig in and fight. Certainly there was no quick way out.
The lifeline was aerial resupply. The flexibility, technical expertise and
untiring efforts of aircrews and logistics personnel such as the 109th
Quartermaster Company (Air Delivery) enabled the Marines to successfully resist
the NVA's best efforts from January through April 1968. *
|
[Author Affiliation] |
|
A
Marine veteran of the Khe Sanh siege, Peter Brush is a frequent contributor
to Vietnam Magazine. Suggestions for further reading: Valley of Decision,
by John Prados and Ray W Stubbe (Houghton-Mifflin); and The End of the
Line, by Robert Pisor (Norton). |