The 1966 Buddhist Crisis in
Vietnam
@
2003 by Peter Brush
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The end of the Second World War
marked the beginning of the American effort to create a separate and strong
state in
Vietnam.
The purpose of this nation building was to thwart the expansion of communism.
Success would be measured by the ability of the government to incorporate all
elements of Vietnamese society into the new state. The Saigon regime repeatedly
experienced great difficulty in commanding the allegiance of South Vietnam’s
Buddhists. This article discusses the serious1966 clash between Buddhists in
Central Vietnam and the Saigon government.
In 1954, with the support of the
United States
, Ngo Dinh Diem became head of the
new nation of
South Vietnam
.
Under Diem Catholics were appointed to positions of power at all levels of
government and generally enjoyed advantages in all sectors of South Vietnamese
society. The Buddhists, who constituted a majority of Vietnamese, resented the
preferential treatment given to the small Catholic minority. The late 1950s and
early 1960s witnessed a growth in Buddhist institutions in the south, both
secular and religious. This desire to gain influence in proportion to their
numbers led to the emergence of a Buddhist community with a high level of
political and social consciousness. Although they did not take part directly,
Buddhist opposition to the
Saigon
regime was
partly responsible for the November 1963 coup that overthrew Diem.
After Diem, South Vietnamese elites
were unable to formulate a government that could muster any sort of traction.
It was not for lack of trying; coup followed coup until mid-1965, when Air
Force General Nguyen Cao Ky and Army General Nguyen Van Thieu took charge as
Prime Minister and President, respectively. Ky’s support centered on the
generals who were in charge of
South
Vietnam
’s four military regions, or corps.
Due to the special circumstances of the war emergency these men had political
as well as military authority. Corps commanders ruled as virtual warlords and
were well positioned to exert influence on the central government in
Saigon
. The corps commanders supported Ky in his
political aspirations. They knew Ky was acceptable to their American patrons,
and would work to continue to ensure the flow of military assistance from the
U.S.
with
hopefully minimal interference in their regional authority. I Corps, in the
north, was farthest from Saigon, and was home to two of the three largest and
most important cities in
South
Vietnam
.
Premier
Ky
was convinced the Buddhists leaders were traitors who wanted to overthrow his
government (in his memoirs he threatened to kill every Buddhist leader before
leaving office if they tried to overthrow him). He welcomed a showdown with the
Buddhists. According to Ky, General Nguyen Chanh Thi was a “born intriguer” who
had “left-wing inclinations.”
[1]
For siding with the Buddhists Ky decided he had to go. On March 10 1966, Ky
relieved his I Corps commander, precipitating a major political crisis.
General Thi was a devout Buddhist,
an effective combat officer, and popular in I Corps. Thi governed with even
more independence than the other Corps commanders. He had the support of
Buddhists in the area and did nothing to oppose their political goals, which
included an end to the fighting and a negotiated settlement with the Communist
National Liberation Front. Ky and Thieu feared Thi; they saw him as a threat.
U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Army
General William Westmoreland, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara all
supported the Ky-Thieu regime and opposed Thi, considering him too soft on
Communism. The Americans hoped to facilitate the departure of Thi from the
South Vietnamese political scene by offering him a good living in the
United States
and an education for his children. Given this formidable opposition, Thi’s
future in
South Vietnam
looked bleak. However, Thi did have one important ally: Marine Lieutenant
General Lewis Walt, who commanded
U.S.
forces in I Corps and was
senior advisor to South Vietnamese military forces in the region.
[2]
The South Vietnamese Army (ARVN, or
Army of the
Republic
of
Vietnam
) was much more
provincial than the U.S. Army, especially ARVN’s regional forces. General Walt
considered General Thi to be an exceptional military leader, and so commanded
the “deep-rooted” loyalty of his soldiers.
[3]
This potent combination -- political support from the Buddhists and military
support from the ARVN – allowed Thi to resist American pressure to just fade
away. According to the official history of U. S. Marine Corps Vietnam operations
in 1966, “The removal of General Thi caused an immediate shock wave throughout
I Corps.” Thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of
Da Nang
and other northern cities.
[4]
They formed an organization called “The Military-Civilian Struggle Committee”
to support Thi and express opposition to the
Saigon
government. This organization, known as the Struggle Movement, quickly spread.
A radio station in
Da Nang
was taken over and anti-government broadcasts were made. University students in
Hue
joined the movement.
A general strike was called which lasted for a few days. The stakes were raised
when the Struggle Movement claimed authority over the armed forces of Quang
Nam
province, which included
Da Nang
and its important military
facilities. Buddhists in
Hue
took over the local
radio station and joined the Struggle Movement in opposition to the
Saigon
government. By the end of March the situation
worsened. General Thi slipped back into I Corps where he was met by
enthusiastic crowds in both
Da Nang
and
Hue
. The movement became
anti-American as well as anti-Saigon government. It increased its influence
until most of I Corps was operating independent of central Vietnamese
government control.
[5]
Washington
became alarmed.
Saigon
decided to act. On April 3, Ky held a news conference in which he proclaimed
Da Nang
to be in the
hands of Communists and vowed to launch an operation to regain control. The
following night Ky dispatched three battalions of South Vietnamese Marines
(VNMC), to
Da Nang
on
U.S.
military aircraft. The
Vietnamese Marines stayed at the
Da
Nang
airbase and did not attempt to retake control of
the city from rebel forces. General Walt was in a difficult position, caught
between Vietnamese Marines loyal to the
Saigon
government and Vietnamese Army forces who supported the anti-Ky Struggle
Movement.
On April 9 the situation became
more ominous. Pro-Struggle Movement ARVN Colonel Dam Quang Yeu dispatched a
convoy of infantry, armor, and artillery from Hoi An toward
Da Nang
. USMC Major General Wood Kyle,
commander of the 3d Marine Division, ordered the 9th Marines to
block Route 1 in order to stop the convoy. A Marine platoon from Foxtrot 2/9,
supported by two Ontos antitank vehicles, stalled a 2 ½ ton truck on the bridge
and took up positions on the northern side. A flight of Vietnamese Air Force
(VNAF) attack planes buzzed the U.S. Marine position. His progress blocked,
Colonel Yeu aimed his 155 mm howitzers at the airfield. General Walt dispatched
Marine Colonel John Chaisson to the bridge site. Chaisson warned Yeu not to
proceed any further. To reinforce this point, a flight of Marine F-8E attack
aircraft, loaded with rockets and bombs, circled overhead. Walt further ordered
the Marines to aim 155 mm and 8-inch guns at the ARVN position.
[6]
Yeu told Chaission he was a friend
of the American Marines “but he had come to fight the
Saigon
government troops who threatened the local people; he had come to lay down his
own life if necessary . . . .” The Vietnamese uncased and fuzed shells for
their big guns. Chaisson warned Yeu his unit faced annihilation if they fired
on the American Marines, then returned to his waiting helicopter and left.
Gradually tension eased. Over the next few days the
Da Nang
and
Hue
radio
stations returned to government control. The Vietnamese Marine force returned
to
Saigon
while ARVN forces in I Corps resumed
operations against the Viet Cong. General Thi publicly disassociated himself
from the Struggle Movement.
[7]
It was only a lull in the storm.
Prime Minister
Ky
feared the Buddhists would take control of the entire central region and
declare the territory autonomous. Without telling either President Thieu or the
Americans, Ky ordered his Chief of Staff, General Cao Van Vien, to lead a force
back to
Da Nang
.
On May 15, loyal Vietnamese Marines and airborne forces flew from Saigon to
Da Nang
. Landing at dawn,
they immediately moved into the city and seized the Vietnamese army
headquarters. American leaders in
Washington
called General Walt to find out what was happening. According to Ky, General
Walt was “furious at an assault without warning on what he regarded as his
territory.” Ky ordered an airplane to fly over the positions of the
pro-Buddhist army forces and drop a message threatening them with destruction
if they fired on his forces.
[8]
General Walt, in his memoirs, makes no mention of being furious. Rather, he
describes himself as being frantic to find out what was going on, glad the Viet
Cong were quiet, and grateful American troops had not yet become involved.
[9]
Again General Walt was caught in the middle. The new I Corps commander, General
Dinh, had the support of most ARVN forces in the region. Like General Walt,
Dinh was caught by surprise by the arrival of Ky’s forces. Dinh sought asylum
at U.S. Marine headquarters in order to avoid arrest.
Later that morning two Vietnamese
Air Force aircraft strafed ARVN units near American Marine positions north of
Da Nang
. Fearing
bloodshed, Walt asked the South Vietnamese government to withdraw its forces
from
Da Nang
.
On May 16, Ky rejected this request and replaced Dinh as I Corps Commander with
another general, Huynh Van Cao, a Catholic with no local ties. On May 17,
General Cao flew to
Hue
to visit an ARVN division headquarters. A hostile crowd broke into the division
compound as Cao prepared to depart for
Da
Nang
. As the helicopter lifted off the ground, an ARVN
lieutenant hit it with two pistol rounds. In response, the U.S. Army door
gunner fired a burst that killed the ARVN lieutenant and wounded two ARVN
soldiers. Struggle Movement supporters condemned the Americans for this
interference in Vietnamese internal affairs.
Not only was Ky unwilling to
withdraw his troops, he seemed to welcome this confrontation with the
Americans. According to his memoirs, Ky told his local commanders in
Da Nang
to aim their
biggest guns at the Marine base. If the Americans took action against the
threatening Vietnamese aircraft, the commanders were to “destroy the marine
base. That is an order.” Ky then describes in considerable detail how he flew
to
Da Nang
and
reprimanded General Walt for interfering in affairs that were none of his
concern.
[10]
Better at displaying flamboyance and arrogance than at conducting diplomacy,
fond of sporting silk scarves and a pearl handled revolver, Ky’s dressing down
of General Walt is not mentioned in the latter’s memoirs or the Marine Corps
history of events in Vietnam.
On May 18, Vietnamese Marines moved
to cross a bridge over the Da Nang River that connected the city with the Tiensha Peninsula. They were fired on by Vietnamese
Army troops associated with the Struggle Movement positioned on the other side.
The dissidents sent a message to General Cao, stating they had wired the bridge
with demolitions. If the Vietnamese Marines crossed, the bridge would be
destroyed. Cao relayed this message to Walt. Since this bridge was absolutely
essential to Marine Corps operations, Walt again dispatched Colonel Chaisson to
prevent hostilities between the Vietnamese military factions.
Chaisson convinced the Vietnamese
Marines to pull back, allowing a company of U.S. Marines to occupy their former
position on the west side of the bridge. Chaisson then tried to get permission
from the Struggle Movement commander to position U.S. Marines on the east side.
Permission was denied. Chaisson ordered the Marines into the ARVN positions
anyway. The Americans sat down in the middle of the rebels and made no attempt
to dislodge them. General Walt arrived at the scene. Together with Colonel
Chaisson the two Marine commanders walked across the bridge to the east side. A
Vietnamese warrant officer told them to stop, threatening to blow up the
bridge. Not only had the Vietnamese engineers rigged the bridge for demolition,
they had also rigged for demolition a nearby ammunition dump containing six thousand
tons of munitions.
[11]
The Vietnamese had two heavy
machine guns pointed at the U.S. Marines. The Vietnamese fired at the
Americans, who dove for cover. The situation was very tense. According to
Chaisson, Walt tried to intimidate the Vietnamese officer, “really gave him
hell.”
[12]
While Walt was talking to the Vietnamese warrant officer, the Americans were
secretly cutting the demolition lead-in wires. The Vietnamese officer was not
intimidated; rather, he told Walt, “General we will die together” and brought
his raised hand down to his side. At this signal, another Vietnamese
engineering officer pushed down the plunger on the detonator. According to
Walt, “There was no doubt he expected the bridge to blow on his signal. I shall
never forget the expression on his face when his signal did not blow up the
bridge and us with it.” American Marines
secured both ends of the bridge. Demolitions were removed from both the bridge
and ammunition dump by the Vietnamese engineers who had placed them there. The
second bridge incident was over, but the Struggle Movement crisis
continued.
By late May, Struggle Movement
forces still held several strongpoints in
Da
Nang
. These anti-government forces were well armed and
willing to use their machine guns and automatic weapons against government
troops from time to time. On May 21 General Walt learned the
Saigon
regime decided to use its air force to destroy the resistance forces. Walt was
alarmed, fearful aircraft bombing and strafing in
Da Nang
would cause civilian casualties, including American civilian casualties (there
were over a thousand
U.S.
civilians in
Da Nang
at the time).
[13]
Walt told the present Vietnamese
corps commander (the fourth since the crisis began) of his concerns. No help
there; the commander was afraid of being killed by his own men and moved into
Walt’s headquarters to ensure his personal safety. He claimed he had no control
over the air forces. Walt talked with the Vietnamese air force commander at
Da Nang
with no greater
effect. General Walt next received information that Vietnamese Air Force attack
aircraft were taking off from Da Nang with full loads of rockets and bombs.
Since discussion was yielding no results, Walt ordered the commander of the 1st
Marine Aircraft Wing to arm four jet fighters with air-to-air ordnance.
Struggle Movement machine gun teams
operating near U.S. Marine positions opened fire on ARVN troops. In response,
two Vietnamese Air Force planes attacked with rockets. Three rockets fell short
of the Struggle Movement positions and landed in the Marine area. Eight U.S.
Marines were wounded in the attack. The Marines launched two jets with
instructions to orbit over the Vietnamese aircraft. The Marine pilots were told
to shoot down the Vietnamese airplanes when Walt gave the order. Walt then told
the Vietnamese Air Force commander he would destroy his planes if one rocket,
one bomb, or one round landed in Da Nang.
Next Walt got a telephone call from
Washington
, relaying a complaint from
Saigon
that the U.S. Marines were interfering in
Vietnamese internal affairs. After explaining the situation, Walt was told to
use his best judgment. The Vietnamese then launched four more aircraft to orbit
above the Marine jets. The VNAF commander told Walt if his planes fired on the
Vietnamese planes, they would be shot down. Walt launched two more jets with
instructions to take positions over the second tier of Vietnamese airplanes
sandwiched over
Da Nang
.
This standoff continued for two hours, at which time the Vietnamese planes
returned to base.
The Struggle Movement was not
making any more progress on the ground than the Vietnamese Air Force was making
in the air. About 150 Vietnamese on both sides were killed in the fighting;
another 700 were wounded. 23 Americans, including 18 Marines, were wounded.
General Thi, whose dismissal had initiated the crisis, met with General
Westmoreland in May 24. On May 27 Thi met with Ky at Chu Lai. They agreed the
most helpful thing would be for General Thi to leave I Corps for good. Before
leaving, Thi tried to convince General Cao to return to I Corps headquarters.
Cao feared for the safety of his family, and asked General Westmoreland for
asylum in the
United States
where he would like “to become an American citizen, to join the Marines or
Army, to fight against the communists . . . .”
[14]
Later in the year Thi went into exile in the
United States
. Another Vietnamese
general was appointed I Corps commander by the
Saigon
government. General Houng Xuan Lam turned his attention to fighting the North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong instead of the U. S. Marines and anti-government
forces.
The Struggle Movement in
Da Nang
collapsed, although it continued in
Hue
. On May 26 a large
crowd attended the funeral of the Vietnamese officer who was killed after
firing at General Cao’s helicopter. After the funeral the crowd burned down the
United States Information Services Library. Over the next few days three
Buddhists doused their robes with gasoline and set themselves on fire. Tri
Quang, the Buddhist leader, went on a hunger strike to protest American support
for the
Saigon
regime and interference in
Vietnamese affairs. After threats were received, the 1st ARVN
Division dispatched guards to protect the U.S. Consulate in
Hue
. The guards fled when a mob stormed the
mission, which was set on fire with barrels of gasoline. In response, and with
the assistance of the Americans, Ky sent Vietnamese airborne and Marine
battalions to the military base at Phu Bai. By June 19 all of Hue was under
government control. U.S. Ambassador Lodge publicly praised the Ky regime for
putting down the Struggle Movement, calling it “a solid political victory.”
[15]
According to influential Cornell
University scholar George Kahin (Intervention: How American Became Involved
in Vietnam), the lesson South
Vietnamese critics of the Saigon government learned was that the dominance of
Generals Ky and Thieu could not be contested as long as they had the support of
the United States. After June 1966, the only challenge Ky and Thieu had to face
was from Hanoi and the Viet Cong.
For a political account of the Struggle Movement, see George
McT. Kahin, Intervention: How American Became Involved in Vietnam (NY:
Knopf, 1986). General Walt’s memoirs provide an good insider’s view of the
crisis (Strange War, Strange Strategy (NY: Funk & Wagnals, 1970).
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